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JUDGES AS HUMANS: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
RESEARCH AND THE PROBLEMS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
Chad M. Oldfather* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We demand a lot from judges. The job description calls for traits 
such as impartiality, fairness, independence, integrity, civility, and 
professionalism.1 What is more, the judge should exemplify these traits 
not merely on good days, but every day in every case. The longstanding 
conception of the judge in the American legal system calls for an 
Olympian figure, who remains above the fray and whose primary mode 
of action is detached reaction.2 
That, of course, is an impossible ideal. Judges are people, and 
people are fallible. Observers have undoubtedly always recognized this, 
regardless of however strong the tendencies to believe otherwise.3 
Lately, however, the recognition has become more systematic, 
evidenced by a proliferation of empirical work by both legal scholars 
and political scientists, as well as work drawing on the insights of 
psychology to illuminate judicial behavior.4 The result is an increasingly 
nuanced picture of judicial behavior, and the ways in which it departs 
from our idealized conception. 
                                                          
 *  Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School. A.B., Harvard College; J.D., 
University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to Jason Czarnezki for comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. See, e.g., Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Preserving Judicial Independence—An Exegesis, 29 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 835, 838-39 (2002); M. Margaret McKeown, Don’t Shoot the Canons: 
Maintaining the Appearance of Propriety Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 45, 47 (2005); 
Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct’s Prohibition on Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance of Bias, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 441, 446 (2006). 
 2. For one of the classic depictions of this conception of the judicial role, see Lon L. Fuller, 
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part III.A. 
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This Article begins the task of considering how we might put this 
work to use to improve judicial institutions. Assuming the idealized 
judge represents not merely a popular but also a normative ideal, we 
must consider whether and how to modify the constraints on judicial 
behavior so as to channel it more toward that end. My focus is on one 
recent example of this scholarship—Lawrence Baum’s book Judges and 
Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior.5 In the book, 
Baum draws on social psychology in an effort to take account of the 
effect of judges’ audiences—people whose regard is important to 
them—on their behavior. 
The result of Baum’s inquiry is certainly valuable in enhancing our 
descriptive understanding of judicial behavior. He convincingly argues 
that judges care about what their audiences think of their behavior, that 
they do so largely for non-instrumental reasons, and that this can 
meaningfully affect their behavior as judges. What is less clear are the 
implications of this enhanced understanding for the design of judicial 
institutions and practices. Some of the audiences—such as family and 
social groups—are not the sort from which we could realistically isolate 
judges, nor would that be desirable. A more general difficulty stems 
from the problem of partial information—studies like Baum’s provide us 
with a better understanding of the factors that affect judicial behavior, 
but the picture remains far from complete. Reforms based on a partial 
understanding of the forces at play might, by failing to account for less 
salient aspects of judging, distort rather than reform. While it is tempting 
to suggest that the appropriate response is to wait to implement change 
until we can develop a more complete understanding of judicial 
behavior, waiting is often not a realistic option. Just as courts must 
decide cases based on the information that is available to them, so must 
we, whether by action or inaction, make choices about the nature of 
judicial institutions.6 This requires that we consider and implement 
appropriate changes to the judiciary—such as changing selection 
procedures or ethical rules, creating new courts, or otherwise changing 
the processes of adjudication—without a certain sense of what the 
effects of those changes will be. In doing so, however, we must remain 
mindful of our limitations, making the avoidance of unintended negative 
consequences as prominent a part of the analysis as achieving desired 
ends. 
                                                          
 5. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR (2006). 
 6. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 3 (2006) (discussing what he calls “the institutionalist dilemma”). 
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses 
our collective reluctance to regard judges as ordinary humans, and 
outlines changes in the context in which judging takes place that suggest 
the need for, at the least, greater receptivity to the notion that judges are 
human. Part III discusses Baum’s book, outlining the dominant 
academic conceptions of judicial behavior and Baum’s response to them, 
as well as Baum’s application of psychological work on self-
presentation to judicial behavior, and situates it within the larger body of 
legal scholarship drawing on psychology. Finally, Part IV takes up the 
question of how best to use this sort of scholarship in changing judicial 
institutions. 
II. THE MYTH OF THE NON-HUMAN JUDGE 
However much we may understand, on an intellectual level, that 
judges are mere humans, we have a tendency to believe that somehow 
the process of becoming a judge effects a substantial transformation, and 
that judges become different from the rest of us.7 At least implicitly, we 
impute near-magical properties to the acts of taking an oath and donning 
a black robe, as if they somehow eliminate one’s susceptibility to all the 
foibles, biases, and petty jealousies that are the stuff of day-to-day life. 
Jerome Frank called this “the myth about the non-human-ness of 
judges.”8 This myth persists not only in the eyes of the public, but also to 
a large degree in the estimation of practicing lawyers and legal 
academics. Law school faculties are filled with those who purport to take 
a cynical view regarding the purity of judicial motives. But an awful lot 
of legal scholarship proceeds not only on the assumption that the judicial 
role, properly conceived, involves a search for a more-or-less objectively 
correct answer, but on the further assumption that judges might reach 
                                                          
 7. Cf. Louise Otis & Eric H. Reiter, Mediation by Judges: A New Phenomenon in the 
Transformation of Justice, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 365 (2006) (noting “the perception of the 
judicial office as one of impartiality and independence, which confers on judges a degree of moral 
authority”). Another perspective on this is that we are engaged in a process of willful blindness. 
“Judges have a special role to play in our democracy; they decide when others have messed up or 
been messed with, and the other branches of government have stepped out of line. If we don’t want 
judges popping up on Nightline to weigh in on the latest legal controversy, it’s because we don’t 
want anything to disturb our image of them as black-robed and aloof. Keeping judges at a distance 
from the rest of us makes it easier to hope that they’re also less fallible.” Emily Bazelon, Judges 
Should Have the Right Not to Remain Silent, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2002, at 30. 
 8. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 147 
(1949). 
OLDFATHER.FINAL 1/14/2008 11:54:41 AM 
128 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:125 
that answer if only someone (typically, the author of the scholarship in 
question) will point them the way.9 
This is not to suggest that no transformation accompanies the 
transition from lawyer to judge. Judges consistently report that their 
lives changed in all sorts of ways when they assumed their new role.10 
Their relationships with their former professional peers became more 
distant and formal. They had to curtail their political activity. They 
acquired a new first name. While perhaps disconcerting to the new 
judge, all of this serves a purpose. It reinforces society’s high 
expectations. Though she may never be able to achieve the ideal, we 
expect the judge to make every effort to do so. But it is unrealistic to 
suppose that any transformation is or could be as great as that for which 
the idealized version of the judicial role would call. Judges are, after all, 
human.11 And most are not merely humans, but also quite ordinary 
                                                          
 9. See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 731 
(1987). 
 10. See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE 
STUDY GROUP ON PRE-JUDICIAL EDUCATION 15-16 (2005). 
 11. This is not an infrequently made observation. Indeed, a simple Westlaw search (“judge /3 
human”) turns up all manner of interesting assertions regarding the implications of the humanity of 
judges. These assertions generally take the form “because judges are human, they possess or lack 
characteristic X.” Almost always the existence or non-existence of X is implicitly deemed self-
evidently to flow from the fact that judges are human, and the point is developed no further. 
Examples of the results turned up by such a search include the following: Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 98 (2005) (“Like all humans, judges have 
inherently limited memories, computational skills, and other mental tools.”); Wendy Nicole Duong, 
Law Is Law and Art Is Art and Shall the Two Ever Meet? Law and Literature: The Comparative 
Creative Processes, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7 (2005) (“Judges (as human beings with passion, 
emotions and prejudices, living in a multi-faceted society), also read and hear other things besides 
legal precedents.”); Daniel A. Farber, Backward-Looking Laws and Equal Protection: The Case of 
Black Reparations, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2271, 2298 (2006) (“Judges are human beings and 
necessarily bring their own past experiences to bear when they consider legal issues.”); Chris 
Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the “Affirmance 
Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 375 (2005) (“Judges, 
too, are human beings, and like other human beings, judges surely employ heuristics in their own 
decisionmaking.”); Amy Zimmerman Hodges, Identifying the Linguistic Boundaries of Sex: Court 
Language Choice in Decisions Regarding the Availability of Sex and Procreation, 11 CARDOZO 
WOMEN’S L.J. 413, 415-16 (2005) (“Simply by being human, a judge, like any of us, uses basic 
knowledge of language as a necessary, often subconscious tool in any writing.”); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 392 (2006) 
(“[T]he judge, being human, is as subject as anyone to the environment and the news coverage that 
shape public opinion in the first place . . . .”); Seth D. Montgomery & Andrew S. Montgomery, 
Jurisdiction As May Be Provided By Law: Some Issues of Appellate Jurisdiction in New Mexico, 36 
N.M. L. REV. 215, 253 (2006) (“[J]udges, like other humans, surely are susceptible to the ‘hydraulic 
pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even 
to accomplish desirable objectives.’”) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)); James 
Michael Scheppele, Are We Turning Judges Into Politicians?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1517, 1524 
(2005) (“Judges are only human, and do not want to lose their jobs or be sent to undesired 
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humans.12 They are therefore susceptible to the same sorts of pressures 
as the rest of us.13 
This hardly constitutes a fresh insight. Indeed, the law recognizes 
the reality of judicial humanity, requiring recusal in situations that 
present temptations that are simply too great for judges to consistently 
ignore. What is more, the law’s conception of those circumstances has 
expanded over time. Early restrictions barring judges from sitting on 
cases in which they have a financial interest have expanded to the 
broader prohibition of “impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety,”14 and restraints against presiding over cases where “the 
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”15 
While recognition of the basic idea of judicial humanity may not be 
new, there is cause to believe that we are coming to an enhanced 
understanding of what it means for judges to be human. Scholars are 
studying judges and judging from an increasing array of perspectives. 
                                                          
assignments.”); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of 
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1995 (1989) (“Judges are human and humans tend to abuse 
power when they have it . . . .”); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible 
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1323 (2005) 
(“Judges are indeed human; like jurors, they are often unable to ‘close the [v]alves of [their] 
attention.’”) (quoting THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 143 (Thomas H. Johnson ed., 
1960) (1890)). 
 12. “Politics, personal friendships, ideology, and pure serendipity play too large a role in the 
appointment of federal judges to warrant treating the judiciary as a collection of sainted genius-
heroes miraculously immune to the tug of self-interest.” RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 
110 (1995). 
 13. Cardozo’s classic statement of the point is worth revisiting: 
I have spoken of the forces of which judges avowedly avail to shape the form and 
content of their judgments. Even these forces are seldom fully in consciousness. They lie 
so near the surface, however, that their existence and influence are not likely to be 
disclaimed. But the subject is not exhausted with the recognition of their power. Deep 
below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the 
prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which 
make the man, whether he be litigant or judge. . . . There has been a certain lack of 
candor in much of the discussion of the theme, or rather perhaps in the refusal to discuss 
it, as if judges must lose respect and confidence by the reminder that they are subject to 
human limitations. I do not doubt the grandeur of the conception which lifts them into 
the realm of pure reason, above and beyond the sweep of perturbing and deflecting 
forces. None the less, if there is anything of reality in my analysis of the judicial process, 
they do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and we shall not help the cause 
of truth by acting and speaking as if they do. The great tides and currents which engulf 
the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by. 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167-68 (1921). 
 14. ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 29 (2004) (quoting Canon 2: “A Judge 
Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge’s Activities.”). 
 15. Id. at 184 (quoting Canon 3E(1): “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a 
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”). 
OLDFATHER.FINAL 1/14/2008 11:54:41 AM 
130 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:125 
Although social-scientific evaluation of judicial behavior dates back to 
at least the 1930s,16 recent years have witnessed the application of a 
growing array of methodological tools to the study of judicial behavior.17 
Meanwhile, the contours of the judicial role have changed. 
Whatever the normative desirability of a system in which the Olympian 
judge largely reacts to what the parties have put before the court,18 such 
a depiction is no longer descriptively accurate. Today’s judges preside 
over caseloads many times the size of those of their counterparts a half-
century ago, and involving a vastly larger range of issues and often 
considerably more complicated factual inquiries.19 As a consequence, 
the nature of the tasks judges must perform has likewise evolved. Trial 
court judges rarely preside over trials,20 instead filling a more 
“managerial” role and influencing cases from a relatively early stage.21 
Appellate court judges no longer enjoy the ability to engage in unhurried 
reflection over the cases before them, or even to write most of the 
opinions issued under their names.22 They, too, have assumed a more 
managerial role, presiding over a staff of law clerks who draft most 
opinions and perform many of the other tasks traditionally within the 
judicial role. 
It seems reasonable to imagine that these sorts of changes in the 
context in which judging takes place—and indeed in the nature of 
judging itself—have affected judges’ perception of and performance in 
their role. Indeed, some have suggested that what has resulted is 
bureaucratized justice.23 One of the characteristics of this phenomenon is 
that judges take a very different orientation to their work than did their 
predecessors, potentially viewing it as a product of their chambers—“the 
product of ‘many hands’”24—rather than as their own, personal product. 
                                                          
 16. See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 261, 269-75 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
 17. See infra notes 29-43, 94-104 and accompanying text. 
 18. Indeed, Fuller’s work appears to be enjoying something of a renaissance as a basis for 
suggestions regarding the appropriate content of the judicial role. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, An 
Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 34-37 (2003); Christopher J. Peters, 
Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 349 & n.138 (1997). 
 19. See Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational 
Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 768-79 (2006). 
 20. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related 
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). 
 21. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-78, 386 (1982). 
 22. Oldfather, supra note 19, at 768-71. 
 23. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 
1444-49, 1452-59 (1983). 
 24. Id. at 1456 (internal citations omitted). 
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This, in turn, results in a reduction in the judge’s sense of responsibility 
for that product, and in a consequent reduction in its overall quality.25 
These changes underscore the need to revisit the institutional 
architecture of the judiciary. Whatever the appropriate balance of 
independence and accountability, there is no reason to believe that the 
mechanisms developed to achieve that balance in the past continue to 
perform that task in an adequate fashion. We might likewise question 
whether concepts like “impropriety” and “impartiality” adequately 
capture the appropriate metrics by which to police judicial ethics. 
Indeed, a number of commentators have recently considered the 
effects of the systemic changes identified above (and more) on the 
administration of justice, and to developing appropriate responses.26 This 
work, like most legal scholarship more generally, has tended to rely on 
casual empiricism in the form of “common-sense” conjecture about the 
likely effects of a given rule on judicial behavior. Put another way, the 
analysis tends toward the speculative, both in terms of describing how 
the world presently operates and predicting how a proposed modification 
would affect that operation. Such analysis has historically been 
necessary in law simply because institutions must function and cases 
must be decided, and in neither situation can the task await the 
development of a comprehensive understanding of human behavior or 
scientific causation or whatever might be necessary to a fully informed 
decision. We do the best we can with the information available, and 
hope that time reveals our decision to be correct. 
The recent surge in interdisciplinary analysis of judicial behavior 
holds out the promise—or perhaps the illusion—that this will change. 
With a more nuanced appreciation of the forces at work in judicial 
behavior, one imagines, we will be able to more carefully calibrate the 
various constraints on judges to achieve our desired ends. But there is 
reason for skepticism. The law does not, of course, have a perfect track 
record in terms of incorporating scientific insights. A great deal of the 
law of evidence, for example, is based on long-discredited assumptions 
about human behavior.27 This is unfortunate. To the extent that the 
                                                          
 25. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1996); 
THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS (1994). 
 27. See, e.g., DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 
316-17 (2004) (exploring the questionable psychological underpinnings of evidentiary doctrine 
relating to character evidence); see also John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA 
L. REV. 1209 (2006) (discussing the untrustworthy generalizations that laws and rules of evidence 
may be based on). 
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sciences have developed an understanding germane to a particular topic, 
we ought to draw on that understanding. The question is how best to do 
so. 
III. JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 
A. The Incompleteness of Dominant Models of Judicial Behavior 
Among the many recent efforts to begin the process of rounding out 
our understanding of judicial behavior is Laurence Baum’s Judges and 
Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior.28 Baum is a 
political scientist, and part of his project is to demonstrate the 
incompleteness of his discipline’s description of judicial behavior. He 
opens by surveying the dominant conceptions of the judicial role as 
viewed by political scientists. There are three: the legal, attitudinal, and 
strategic models. The legal model views the judicial role as involving 
primarily an effort to follow the requirements of legal doctrine and to 
make good law in those cases where existing doctrine does not supply 
the required answers.29 Under the strongest versions of this model, 
judging entails complete indifference to the policy consequences of 
decisions.30 Although this extreme version did not survive the legal 
realist movement, many scholars (to a considerably larger extent in law 
schools than on political science faculties) continue to view legal 
doctrine as playing a meaningful, if not dispositive, role in judicial 
decision making.31 Attitudinal models, in contrast, view judges as acting 
purely on the basis of their policy preferences.32 “They cast votes and 
write opinions that perfectly reflect their own views, regardless of what 
their court colleagues and other policymakers might do in response.”33 
                                                          
 28. BAUM, supra note 5. 
 29. Id. at 8-9. 
 30. Id. at 8. 
 31. Id. at 9. 
 32. Id. at 7. For discussions of the attitudinal model, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE 
SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 38-39 (2005); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. 
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86-97 (2002). 
 33. BAUM, supra note 5, at 7. The attitudinal model rests on a relatively narrow conception of 
the factors that motivate judges. For example, at its most basic level, the attitudinal model holds that 
“Rehnquist [voted the way he did] because he [was] extremely conservative; Marshal voted the way 
he did because he [was] extremely liberal.” SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 32, at 65. One exception 
involves “public choice” or “interest group” models of judging. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 12, at 
109-44 (positing that judges might derive utility from various aspects of the position including not 
only the salary and possibly enhanced leisure opportunities, but also popularity, prestige, reputation, 
public interest, and the inherent joys of playing the “judicial game”). Another alternative uses legal 
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Strategic models likewise view judges as acting to effect their policy 
preferences, but in a considerably more nuanced and less reflexive 
manner.34 They do not focus simply on the case at hand, but take a 
longer view. Thus, for example, a strategic judge will be content to agree 
to a result that she might not view as optimal in the present case in order 
to secure the votes of her colleagues and thereby to avoid the greater evil 
of the contrary result.35 What is more, she will take other considerations 
into account, such as the need to seek reelection or even to satisfy the 
public’s expectation that judicial decisions will be based on legal 
considerations.36 Due in part to its relative comprehensiveness, “a 
strategic conception of judicial behavior is now the closest thing to a 
conventional wisdom about judicial behavior.”37 
One of Baum’s central points is that these models share a 
fundamental shortcoming arising out of one of their common 
assumptions. That assumption is that judges “act solely on their interest 
in the substance of legal policy, whether that interest is centered on 
policy or on a combination of law and policy.”38 Judges under the legal 
and attitudinal models bear a resemblance to Mr. Spock39 in that they 
“act without emotion or self-interest in order to advance the general 
good.”40 This tendency is even more pronounced in the strategic models. 
Because of the large number of inputs judges acting under that model 
take into account in making their strategic calculations—Baum invokes 
Dworkin’s Hercules41 as an example of a fully strategic judge42—the 
task of judging requires tremendous mental effort. “These judges court 
                                                          
interpretive approaches and institutional characteristics to model judicial decision making. See 
Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of 
Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841 (2006). 
 34. The strategic “account rests on a few simple propositions: justices may be primarily 
seekers of legal policy, but they are not unconstrained actors who make decisions based only on 
their own ideological attitudes. Rather, justices are strategic actors who realize that their ability to 
achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of other actors, the choices they 
expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act.” LEE EPSTEIN & JACK 
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998). 
 35. BAUM, supra note 5, at 6. 
 36. Id. at 6-7. 
 37. Id. at 7. 
 38. Id. at 9; see also SEGAL ET AL., supra note 32, at 34-35; EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 
34, at 23. 
 39. Baum felt it necessary to further identify Mr. Spock in a footnote, which suggests that I 
ought to as well. As Baum notes, Spock “was one of the leading characters in the Star Trek 
television show and movies. Spock was half-Vulcan, and Vulcans were characterized by both their 
altruism and their devotion to reason.” BAUM, supra note 5, at 18 n.16. 
 40. Id. at 18. 
 41. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-06 (1977). 
 42. BAUM, supra note 5, at 18 n.16. 
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exhaustion with their arduous and often futile efforts to advance their 
conceptions of good policy, efforts they expend only for the personal 
satisfaction of trying to improve public policy . . . . [B]y standards of 
ordinary behavior the fully strategic judge seems enormously 
altruistic.”43 
Baum concedes that there may be good reason to believe that 
judges are concerned with making good law or good policy. But there is 
not, he suggests, good reason to believe that this is their only concern, or 
even their dominant concern. Judges lack a strong incentive to make 
decisions on that basis, particularly given that they generally stand to 
gain very little in the way of direct benefits from their rulings.44 At the 
same time, other factors might sway a judge from the path of pursuing 
legal or policy goals, such as a desire to get along with one’s colleagues 
on a multimember court, to advance one’s career, or to lessen the 
burdens posed by one’s workload.45 
In light of this, Baum characterizes the strategic conception of 
judicial behavior as requiring something quite extraordinary. He 
demonstrates by contrasting the assumptions of a strategic model of 
judging with those made by standard economic models of human 
behavior. The latter assume that people are consistently rational and 
motivated by self-interest, assumptions that have been called into 
increasing question in recent years.46 Yet “[j]udges in the dominant 
models of judicial behavior depart further from reality: they share 
rationality and self-control with orthodox economic actors but act on the 
basis of complete altruism rather than complete self-interest.”47 
This conception is remarkable not only in its general denial of a 
basic aspect of judicial humanity, but also in its implications. Among 
other things, the single-minded focus on policy envisioned by the 
dominant models suggests that judges care what others think of their 
performance only to the extent that others’ impressions have 
instrumental significance. Thus, if a given group’s opinions will have no 
bearing on the success of the judge’s efforts to advance his conception of 
appropriate policy, then that group’s esteem will have no effect on the 
judge’s behavior. Whatever the merits of the dominant models—and 
                                                          
 43. Id. at 18. 
 44. Id. at 10-11. 
 45. Id. at 11-14. 
 46. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 
(2000). 
 47. BAUM, supra note 5, at 21. 
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Baum is clear about his belief that they have considerable merit—Baum 
deems this to be too large an oversight of too fundamental a component 
of human nature. Judges are humans, and a realistic conception of 
judicial behavior must account for that basic humanity. 
B. Judges and the Company They Keep 
Baum’s central argument is that judges are concerned with others’ 
assessments of their performance, and that the bases of this concern are 
not exclusively, and not even primarily, instrumental. He contends “that 
judges care about the regard of salient audiences because they like that 
regard in itself, not just as a means to other ends. Further, [he argues,] 
judges’ interest in what their audiences think of them has fundamental 
effects on their behavior as decision makers.”48 Baum does not propose 
an alternative model of judicial behavior based on the relationship 
between judges and their audiences, but rather suggests that such a 
perspective is useful to enhance the descriptive power of the dominant 
models.49 
C. The Importance of Personal Audiences 
Drawing on the work of social psychologists, Baum identifies three 
simple premises: 
1. People want to be liked and respected by others who are important 
 to them. 
2. The desire to be liked and respected affects people’s behavior. 
3. In these respects, judges are people.50 
The mechanism through which the desire to be liked affects our 
behavior is that of self-presentation—conscious and semiconscious 
efforts to make a favorable impression on others. These efforts fall into 
two broad categories: self-presentation motivated by instrumental 
concerns (the desire to secure some concrete gain from an audience), and 
that motivated by personal concerns (the desire to “seek popularity and 
respect as ends in themselves, not as means to other ends”).51 
Self-presentation motivated by instrumental concerns sounds an 
awful lot like strategic judging, and it is not Baum’s focus. He instead 
directs his attention to personally motivated self-presentation. In order to 
                                                          
 48. Id. at 4. 
 49. Id. at 23 n.19. 
 50. Id. at 25. 
 51. Id. at 28-29. 
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justify that focus, he must of course make the case that some significant 
portion of judicial behavior is motivated by personal rather than 
instrumental concerns. 
Baum begins by identifying two primary instrumental purposes that 
might motivate judicial self-presentation: career advancement, and the 
furthering of legal or policy goals.52 Baum then argues that these types 
of instrumental motivations cannot account for all of judges’ activities in 
presenting themselves to their audiences. He bases this in part on the 
claim that a judge’s incentives to make good law or effect good policy 
simply are not that strong, such that there is plenty of room for other 
motivations to affect behavior.53 He also provides examples, pointing to 
Judges Samuel Kent and Alex Kozinski as among those whose written 
opinions are inconsistent with what one would expect from judges 
seeking elevation to a higher court—an ambition that Judge Kozinski at 
least has quite openly held.54 Judge Kent’s opinions colorfully berating 
lawyers have been widely circulated via the Internet,55 and Judge 
Kozinski has a history of colorful language both in his opinions and in 
his nonjudicial writings, as well as of such nonstereotypical behavior as 
nominating himself as a “Superhottie[] of the Federal Judiciary.”56 Baum 
likewise suggests that Justice Scalia provides an example of a jurist 
whose judicial writings—particularly his “strongly worded dissents”—
are unlikely to serve him well in advancing his legal and policy goals.57 
These examples may not make the point as forcefully as Baum 
intends. At least for a time, Judge Kozinski’s quirkiness looked like it 
might well land him on the Supreme Court. And it seems far from 
certain that Justice Scalia’s irascibility has served him poorly. Indeed, 
some argue that he has been remarkably effective in advancing his 
                                                          
 52. Somewhat curiously, in light of the dominant models’ assumption that judges are 
motivated solely by their legal and policy goals, Baum suggests that career advancement is probably 
the strongest of these instrumental motivations. Id. at 39-40. 
 53. Id. at 44. 
 54. Id. at 40. 
 55. See Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 11, 11 (2001). Judge Kent has 
recently made the news for even less savory behavior. See Lise Olsen & Harvey Rice, The Case of a 
Federal Judge Who Went Much Too Far, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 11, 2007, at B1, available at 
http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=2007_4458658. 
 56. BAUM, supra note 5, at 38 & n.10; Underneath Their Robes: Courthouse Forum: The Hot. 
Alex Kozinski, http://underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com/main/2004/06/courthouse_foru.html (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2007). 
 57. BAUM, supra note 5, at 40-41. 
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agenda, especially given the frequency with which he is not in the 
majority.58 
More generally, there is a considerable distance between 
“instrumental considerations are not everything” to “personal 
explanations are the best explanation for judges’ off-bench self-
presentation.” Baum acknowledges that instrumental and personal 
motivations often reinforce one another, and that their effects are 
consequently often difficult to disentangle.59 Yet Baum does very little 
to justify the dominant role he ascribes to personal motivations.60 As 
noted above, Baum relies in part on his conclusion that legal and 
political goals provide relatively weak incentives for judicial behavior as 
compared to personal regard. Elsewhere he suggests that the immediacy 
of the payoff to the judge may also play a role. While the ultimate 
impact of a decision in terms of law or policy may be hard to measure 
and may take a long time to manifest itself, the approval of a personal 
audience is likely to be more tangible and immediate.61 But these 
assertions are not presented together as part of a cohesive argument, and 
instead must be cobbled together from various sections of the book. 
Indeed, at times it is difficult to determine precisely what claim 
Baum is making. While he generally suggests that personal audiences 
are the most significant thing (“Those audiences whose esteem is 
important to judges chiefly for personal reasons are typically more 
salient and thus have greater potential impact on judicial behavior.”62), 
his language occasionally evokes the more limited claim “that personal 
audiences have a substantial impact on judges’ choices.”63 
Still, Baum succeeds in making the fundamental point that judges’ 
personal self-presentation ought to be taken into account. That he is 
comparatively less able to articulate the precise sorts of situations in 
which personal and instrumental motivations might pull in different 
directions is undoubtedly not the result of shortcomings in his efforts so 
much as of the difficulties inherent in generalizing from conclusions 
drawn from controlled experimentation to the considerably messier 
                                                          
 58. See, e.g., Posting of Michael Dimino to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2006/09/happy_anniversa.html (Sept. 26, 2006, 12:57 EST) (“Though many disagree 
with his methodology and conclusions, there can be no doubt that he has changed the way legal 
arguments are made, and that the views he has championed carry much more weight now than they 
did twenty years ago because of the voice he has given to them.”). 
 59. BAUM, supra note 5, at 29, 45-46. 
 60. See id. at 40-42. 
 61. Id. at 45. 
 62. Id. at 48. 
 63. Id. at 49. 
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reality of the legal system. This is not to suggest that his conclusion is 
necessarily wrong so much as it is to suggest that he has not fully made 
the case that personal motives are at the heart of judicial behavior, or 
provided a concrete framework based on which to assess the relative 
importance of personal and instrumental motivations. 
The analysis nonetheless produces some useful insights. For 
example, even if one suggests that judges are likely to choose personal 
audiences that reflect their pre-existing policy and legal positions, it does 
not follow that personal audiences will have no effects. First, we do not 
always have the luxury to choose our personal audiences.64 Our families, 
social groups, and professional peers are often selected for reasons 
independent of our free choice. Second, personal audiences can affect 
behavior even where the judge and the audience share the same basic 
points of view.65 If an instrumental audience also has personal 
significance to a judge, the judge will not only be that much more likely 
to reach decisions consistent with the audience’s preference in any given 
case, but also to do so in a manner that is more aligned with the 
audience’s preference in a qualitative sense. Put differently, a judge with 
conservative personal audiences would thereby be more likely not only 
to reach conservative decisions, but also to reach decisions that are more 
conservative than they would otherwise be. 
D. The Identity of Judges’ Personal Audiences 
The bulk of Baum’s analysis considers the various audiences to 
whom judges might engage in self-presentation.66 He contends that 
judges social groups and professional peers are the audiences that have 
the greatest influence on their behavior. The dominant models assume 
that the influence of social groups on judges’ behavior has run its course 
by the time they reach the bench, and that in any case judges have no 
great incentive to please their social groups for their own sake simply 
because those groups have no ability to frustrate the judges’ legal or 
policy goals.67 These assumptions do not hold, Baum asserts, if judges 
are like the rest of us. “Because social groups are so integral to people’s 
                                                          
 64. Id. at 46. 
 65. Id. at 46-47. 
 66. Chapter three focuses on the audiences that have already received consideration in prior 
scholarship on judicial behavior, including judges’ judicial colleagues, the public, and the other 
branches of government. In general, Baum concludes that the influence of these audiences is not 
significant. Id. at 86-87. 
 67. Id. at 89. 
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sense of themselves, people have strong incentives to please members of 
these groups and to avoid alienating them.”68 
The nature of the resulting influences is unclear: 
  As an audience, social groups can affect judges in multiple ways. 
To take one example, judges may want their families and friends to 
perceive them as people who embody virtues such as impartiality that 
they associate with good judges. This goal could move judges to act in 
ways that emphasize their fealty to the law as a basis for judgment. 
Alternatively, judges may want to be seen as acting consistently with 
the policy views that predominate in their social circles. This second 
type of impact is not necessarily the more powerful, but its potential 
effects are easier to trace.69 
Baum uses the federal courts’ response (often better characterized 
as a lack of response) to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education as one illustration of the powerful effect that 
personal audiences can have on the judiciary,70 and judicial 
responsiveness to women’s rights issues as another.71 
An orientation toward the legal community as a personal audience 
might pull in a slightly different direction. Because lawyers are 
socialized to value the role of law as the appropriate source of legal 
decisions, “judges who want the respect of practicing lawyers, legal 
academics, and other judges have an incentive to be perceived as 
committed to the law and skilled in its interpretation.”72 As a result, here 
is another way in which judicial backgrounds might matter. Judges who 
spent most of their pre-judicial careers in the practice of law should be 
more responsive to the legal community as an audience. Those coming 
from a largely political career, in contrast, could be expected to be 
relatively indifferent to the bar.73 
Baum also examines the possibility that policy groups and news 
media might also function as personal audiences for judges. Policy 
groups can of course play a significant role as instrumental audiences, 
both in terms of career advancement as well as through the work of 
advocating on behalf of a judge’s preferred policies. But there can be a 
substantial personal aspect as well. “If people who share a point of view 
about legal policy function as a reference group for a judge, the judge 
                                                          
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 90. 
 70. Id. at 90-94. 
 71. Id. at 94-97. 
 72. Id. at 106. 
 73. Id. at 114. 
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has an incentive to take actions that those people approve. That is 
especially true when their approval would counterbalance criticism from 
other sources.”74 What results is not fundamental change—a policy 
group is unlikely to serve as a personal audience for a judge that does 
not already share its basic conception of good policy—but rather the 
reinforcement of the judge’s preexisting viewpoint, and of greater 
consistency in its application.75 Because the judge values, for its own 
sake, the esteem in which she is held by a policy group, she has an 
incentive to reach decisions that will maintain that esteem, even if those 
decisions are different from the decisions she would have made in the 
absence of the policy group. 
The possibility that interest in obtaining favorable news coverage 
might motivate judicial decisions has received attention lately. Thomas 
Sowell called this “the Greenhouse effect” after The New York Times 
reporter Linda Greenhouse. Sowell believed that Greenhouse’s flattery 
of Justice Blackmun provided an important impetus for the Justice’s 
decisions.76 Baum posits that the news media might serve as an 
important personal audience in two respects. First, for the simple reason 
that favorable coverage may represent an end in itself.77 Second, the 
media are a mechanism through which judges can reach their other 
audiences.78 Because of this, he finds a Greenhouse effect plausible. 
“The claim of a Greenhouse effect is especially intriguing because it can 
encompass all four categories of personal audiences discussed in this 
chapter and the preceding one: social groups, the legal profession, the 
mass media, and—less directly—policy groups.”79 
Indeed, he presents empirical support for the claim, in the form of 
an analysis of changes in the voting patterns of Supreme Court Justices 
in civil liberties cases from their first two years on the Court to later 
periods in their tenure. He found that among the nine Republican 
Justices who did not reside in Washington before their elevation to the 
Court—who had not, one might surmise, inoculated themselves against 
the Greenhouse effect: 
[T]here were clear and substantial increases in liberalism for four and 
more limited or ambiguous increases for three others. In contrast, only 
                                                          
 74. Id. at 119. 
 75. Id. at 121. 
 76. Baum cites Thomas Sowell, Blackmun Plays to the Crowd, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Mar. 4, 1994, at 7B, as the first use of the phrase. BAUM, supra note 5, at 139. 
 77. BAUM, supra note 5, at 136. 
 78. Id. at 135-36. 
 79. Id. at 142. 
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one of the nine justices in the other groups [which included Democrats 
and Republicans who resided in Washington before joining the Court] 
had more than minimal increases in liberalism.80 
Significantly, Baum does not present this as conclusive proof of the 
existence of a Greenhouse effect. Other interpretations of the data are 
possible, such as that the changes were motivated by strategic concerns, 
or by basic changes in the Justices’ policy positions as a result of the 
force of contrary argument.81 Moreover, his results “suggest that 
residency had a greater impact on voting change than initial ideological 
positions.”82 Nonetheless, the possibility of a Greenhouse effect is 
plausible under an audience-based conception of judging, and Supreme 
Court Justices, because of their autonomy and insulation from political 
or career-based pressures, might be uniquely susceptible to it.83 
E. The Implications of Baum’s Analysis 
The conclusions that Baum draws from his analysis are, as they 
necessarily must be, tentative. His emphasis remains on the central point 
that taking judicial audiences into account reveals shortcomings in the 
perspective of the dominant models. Still, Baum suggests some ways in 
which an audience-based perspective will provide insights not otherwise 
accounted for in the dominant models. Among other things, he suggests 
quite plausibly that judges’ personal audiences are likely to consist 
largely of elites.84 Thus, he suggests, Justice Scalia’s assertion in 
Lawrence v. Texas, that the majority of his colleagues on the Supreme 
Court acted in large part due to their having been influenced by elite 
legal culture, may have some truth to it.85 This is not an effect that is 
necessarily consistent, either in terms of its effect across the range of 
judges (who will differ in the nature of the elites that form their social 
groups and personal audiences) or in terms of its political valence (elites 
might tend to be more socially than economically liberal). But the point 
remains that “[g]roups that do not serve as personal audiences for judges 
are at a relative disadvantage in shaping judges’ choices unless they 
connect well with judges’ instrumental incentives.”86 General public 
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opinion, in other words, will likely have a weaker effect on judicial 
behavior than the opinion of judges’ personal audiences.87 
All of this suggests a related point of difference. If judges are 
affected by their personal audiences, and if their personal audiences 
differ, then a one-size-fits-all approach to assessing the determinants of 
judicial behavior will miss much of what actually drives that behavior.88 
Thus we might profit from studying judicial behavior in light of the 
number and type of appearances that judges make before policy 
groups.89 In similar fashion, because judges’ career paths are likely to be 
suggestive of some of the audiences to which they orient themselves, 
increasing study of judicial backgrounds might prove useful.90 And 
because “the sets of audiences that are most salient to judges may vary 
systematically across courts”91 an increased focused on the differences 
between judges at varying levels of the judicial hierarchy could likewise 
prove beneficial.92 Since lower-court judges are more likely to have 
personal ties with their local counterparts in other branches of 
government, for example, we might expect to see such judges place 
greater weight on those sets of interests.93 
IV. A CALL FOR METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM  
AND THEORETICAL AGNOSTICISM 
Judges and Their Audiences is not the sort of book that breaks new 
ground by uncovering previously hidden aspects of judicial behavior. 
Nor does it purport to do so. Consequently, along that dimension there is 
little, if anything, new here. For example, the notion that the interaction 
between judges and their colleagues (that is, one of their personal 
audiences) will tend to reinforce and strengthen preexisting decisional 
tendencies lies at the heart of Cass Sunstein’s recent exploration of 
“ideological amplification,”94 and has a relatively lengthy pedigree.95 
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 88. Id. at 168. 
 89. Id. at 167. 
 90. Id. at 167-68. 
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 92. Id. at 169-70. 
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 94. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 8-16 (2006) (exploring the effects of “ideological amplification” and 
“ideological dampening”). 
 95. Sunstein and his colleagues cite to ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 1986). 
See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 94, at 154 n.8. Steven Pinker has traced the underlying 
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Nor is Baum the first to apply insights from psychology to judicial 
decision making. “Behavioral law and economics” draws heavily on 
cognitive psychology to portray human decision making as boundedly 
rational and as incorporating all manner of biases and heuristics that lead 
to regular departures from rationality.96 This has led to a tremendous 
amount of interesting legal scholarship, some of which has focused 
specifically on the judging process.97 There are other examples. 
Lawrence Wrightsman has devoted an entire volume to various 
applications of psychology to judicial decision making.98 Dan Simon has 
developed a psychological model of judicial decision making.99 And 
these are only a few. 
The portrait that emerges from this growing body of work is messy 
and complex. Judges are susceptible to all sorts of influences and 
psychological processes as they make decisions, only some of which are 
consistent with the dispassionate, rational, Olympian figure at the heart 
of our conception of judging. In this respect judges are—like the rest of 
us—human. 
A substantial part of Baum’s contribution here is that he 
underscores this point. Political scientists have developed a conception 
of judicial behavior that, in placing a desire to achieve policy goals as its 
centerpiece, departs from reality. Legal academics, though perhaps 
adhering less consistently to a single, coherent model of how judges act, 
likewise tend to assume that judges are driven largely by legal doctrine. 
Both camps have remained largely oblivious not only to one another, but 
                                                          
psychological research back to the 1950s. See Posting of Steven Pinker to The New Republic: Open 
University, http://www.tnr.com/blog/openuniversity?pid=35618 (Sept. 4, 2006, 14:03 EST). 
 96. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1998) (arguing that “behavior is systematic and can be modeled” and 
providing numerous examples of such models); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 46, at 1058 (arguing 
that this new approach allows scholars “to understand the incentive effects of law better than 
modern law and economics is able to do by enlisting more sophisticated understandings of both the 
ends of those governed by law and the means by which they attempt to achieve their ends”). 
 97. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 
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Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006); Russell Korobkin, The 
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A 
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998). 
 98. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: IS PSYCHOLOGY RELEVANT? 
(1999). Wrightsman covers some of the same ground as Baum, but does so within the framework of 
the attitudinal model. He assumes that policy goals drive decision making, and explores how the 
concept of “motivated reasoning” might enable judges with differing policy goals to come to 
divergent assessments of the same case. Id. at 55-56. 
 99. See Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1 
(1998). 
OLDFATHER.FINAL 1/14/2008 11:54:41 AM 
144 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:125 
to the rest of social science (with economics being a notable exception in 
the case of legal scholars).100 This is changing. The legal academy has, 
for example, become increasingly receptive to the sorts of quantitative 
empirical analysis practiced by political scientists. At least as between 
law and political science, then, “interdisciplinary ignorance” seems to be 
in moderate decline.101 Psychology is a relative latecomer, but one with 
significant insights that have themselves found increasing play in the 
depiction of judicial behavior. 
The complex, human judge presents a difficult creature for the legal 
system.102 We cannot count on him to reliably follow the law, or even to 
reliably decide cases consistent with some relatively constant, 
underlying conception of good policy. Indeed, given the number of cases 
on his docket and the amount and nature of assistance provided by his 
law clerks, it may not even be that we can meaningfully count on him to 
“decide” some of the cases before him at all.103 Not surprisingly, any 
effort to take all of this complexity into account would make for difficult 
prediction, which is why academic models tend toward simplification.104 
The fewer the variables under consideration, the easier it tends to be to 
account for the impact of those variables. 
But what makes for bad, or at least cumbersome and inelegant, 
social science may be necessary in the context of legal reform. Efforts to 
refine the institutional context in which judging takes place—that is, to 
structure the judicial role in such a way as to channel actual judicial 
behavior closer to ideal judicial behavior—are likely to benefit from 
more developed knowledge of judicial psychology. Institutional reform 
based on the sort of necessarily incomplete picture of judicial behavior 
imagined by the predominant models may be undesirable simply 
because it fails to account for all of what is driving the phenomena 
sought to be addressed. Under the legal model, for example, the response 
to a series of bad decisions is to call for better law. But if the law is 
insufficiently determinate to compel the “right” results in every case, 
                                                          
 100. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Across the Great 
Divide (Between Law and Political Science), 3 GREEN BAG 2D 267 (2000). 
 101. See Posting of William Ford to Empirical Legal Studies: Blog Forum—Interdisciplinary 
Ignorance and the Great Divide, http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/10/ 
blog_forum_inte.html (Oct. 1, 2006, 23:10 EST). 
 102. For a discussion of this phenomenon with specific reference to behavioral law and 
economics, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, 
and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 748-52 (2000). 
 103. See Oldfather, supra note 19, at 770-71. 
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RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 263 (2001). 
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and cannot realistically be made specific enough to compel those results 
in all or most of the cases that might arise, then such a remedy will be 
incomplete. Alternatively, such regulation may have unintended 
consequences. If we accept the attitudinal model’s assumption that 
ideology is the driving force behind judicial behavior, then we might 
consider altering judicial selection procedures to exclude or discourage 
those with a strong history of political activity from becoming judges. 
But in so doing, we might inadvertently lower the quality of judging if 
political activity turns out to be positively correlated with some trait that 
we accept as desirable in judges, such as life experience or raw 
intelligence.105 
Only by first locating the potential weak points in the judicial 
psyche can we hope to create institutions and develop mechanisms that 
serve as prophylactics against any resulting undesired consequences. 
Baum’s analysis provides some examples. If mere contact with personal 
audiences tends to skew judicial behavior in what we conclude are 
undesirable ways, then we might want to rethink the way we go about 
regulating those relationships. And if some of the influences seem to be 
beyond direct regulation, then we should consider mechanisms for 
indirect regulation. We might, for example, be willing to entertain the 
possibility of enhanced restrictions on, or greater disclosure and 
monitoring of, interactions between judges and policy or legal groups. 
We are considerably less likely to regulate the relationships between 
judges and their families or social groups. If we conclude that the latter 
sorts of interactions are likely to have pernicious effects, we will need to 
explore alternative means of attempting to channel judicial behavior in 
more appropriate directions, such as efforts to make the process of 
judging more transparent in general.106 
Of course, a commitment to taking psychology into account 
presents its own, parallel set of dangers. An incomplete or inaccurate 
psychological account can just as easily produce prescriptions that 
misdirect behavior as an erroneous account generated on any other basis. 
It may well be that the process of becoming a judge actually does 
insulate judges from some of the psychological shortcomings that afflict 
                                                          
 105. This dynamic is hardly unique to this context. For example, the risk of such unintended 
consequences is one of the drawbacks of informational regulation. Oldfather, supra note 19, at 785-
87. 
 106. I have advanced one such proposal elsewhere. Id. at 795-801.  
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most humans.107 There are other reasons to suspect that the insights of 
psychology ought not to be too aggressively applied to judging. Greg 
Mitchell has made such a point in arguing that much of the early work in 
behavioral law and economics is insufficiently grounded in, or too 
aggressively extends, the psychological research on which it is based.108 
What is more, psychology may ultimately tell us that people possess 
certain traits only intermittently, depending on context, mood, and so 
forth.109 Thus a focus on the apparent revelations of psychology might 
lead to an overemphasis on the identified features of behavior to the 
exclusion of unstudied, and thereby unappreciated but potentially 
powerful, behaviors. 
These points are well taken. Still, the response cannot be simply to 
declare the questions too difficult to address. A complete understanding 
of human—and thus judicial—behavior remains far off, if it is attainable 
at all. In the meantime, we must choose whether to continue with the 
present design of our judicial system or make any of a number of 
potential modifications to it.110 These choices must be informed, and 
undertaken with appropriate caution. Thus we should pursue the task by 
way of methodological pluralism, pursuant to which a given problem 
should be studied using as many methods as available.111 At least as a 
default position, reforms ought to be fashioned in such a way as to “do 
no harm”—that is, be designed to minimize their unintended 
consequences.112 This is not to advocate a general aversion to change. 
The status quo may be, and in many corners of the judiciary undoubtedly 
is, so unacceptable as to warrant some amount of risk that a reform will 
not have its intended or anticipated effects. And bold reform might serve 
goals beyond its instrumental effects, such as by enhancing perceptions 
of judicial legitimacy. None of these things are inconsistent with the sort 
of prudence involved in adopting a broad perspective. 
This approach should be coupled with what we might call 
“theoretical agnosticism.” From a normative perspective, the proper 
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nature of the judicial role is both contestable and contested.113 Those 
charged with the task of institutional design and modification must 
accordingly avoid becoming wedded to any particular account of judicial 
motivations or capacities. They must instead draw on all of what is 
available, and remain mindful of the likelihood that no single theory or 
method will capture all of the factors at play. In this respect it is the 
institutional architects, rather than the judges, who must strive for 
something approaching omniscience. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The belief that those charged with designing the institutions and 
procedures in which judges work can take appropriate account of all 
relevant inputs may be only slightly more realistic than the belief that the 
strategic judge can do so. Still, the appropriate response is not to wait for 
the day we develop a comprehensive understanding of human, and thus 
judicial, behavior. That day may never come. And even if it does, we 
cannot afford to wait. Judges do not have the luxury of deferring rulings 
on complex, contested questions that arise in litigation until the 
underlying science is settled. Neither should we defer questions of how 
best to design institutions to shape judicial behavior until we have a 
complete sense of how specific modifications might interact with human 
psychology. We should instead act with a full understanding that our 
knowledge is provisional and subject to revision, and that mistakes will 
accordingly be made. Such is the way of human institutions. 
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